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Comments of Financial Regulation and Consumer Protection Scholars and Former Regulators on 
Docket No. CFPB-2018-0003 
 
May 14, 2018 
 
Monica Jackson 
Office of the Executive Secretary 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
1700 G Street, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20552 
 
Dear Ms. Jackson: 
 
Please see the submission below in response to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 
(“the Consumer Bureau” or “the Bureau”) Request for Information (“RFI”) regarding Bureau 
Enforcement Processes (Docket No. CFPB-2018-0003; Document No: 2018-05784). We are 
academics who research and teach about consumer protection law, public enforcement of civil law, 
administrative law, financial regulation, and related topics.1 Many of the below signatories have 
experience in public enforcement of consumer protection laws. We appreciate the opportunity to 
submit these comments for your consideration. 
 
Christopher L. Peterson 
John J. Flynn Endowed Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law 
 
 
Richard Alderman 
Professor Emeritus and Director of the Center for Consumer Law, University of Houston Law 
Center 
 
Susan Block-Lieb 
Cooper Family Professor in Urban Legal Issues, Fordham Law School 
 
Mark Budnitz 
Professor of Law Emeritus, Georgia State University College of Law 
 
Daniel Carpenter 
Allie S. Freed Professor of Government, Harvard University 
 
Prentiss Cox 
Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School 
 
Brenda Cude 
Professor, University of Georgia 
                                                     
1 Affiliations of signatories are for identification only and do not represent the views of the various 
institutions. 
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Susan L. DeJarnatt 
Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law 
 
Rashmi Dyal-Chand 
Professor of Law, Northeastern University 
 
Kathleen Engel 
Research Professor, Suffolk University Law School 
 
Pamela Foohey 
Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law 
 
Judith Fox 
Clinical Professor, Notre Dame Law School 
 
Richard Frankel 
Associate Professor, Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law 
 
Jeffrey Gentes 
Visiting Clinical Lecturer, Yale Law School 
 
Eric Gouvin 
Dean and Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law 
 
Celeste Hammond 
Professor, The John Marshall Law School 
 
Robert Hockett 
Edward Cornell Professor of Law, Cornell University 
 
Melissa Jacoby 
Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
 
Dalié Jiménez 
Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law 
 
Kathryn Judge 
Professor, Columbia Law School 
 
Wayne Lewis 
Professor Emeritus, DePaul University College of Law 
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Jeffrey Lubbers 
Professor of Practice in Administrative Law American University, Washington College of Law 
 
Cathy Lesser Mansfield 
Professor of Law, Drake University 
 
Patricia McCoy 
Professor of Law, Boston College Law School 
 
James Nehf 
Professor of Law and Cleon H. Foust Fellow, Indiana University McKinney School of Law 
 
Christopher Odinet 
Horatio C. Thompson Assistant Professor of Law, Southern University Law Center 
 
Gary Pieples 
Teaching Professor & Clinic Director, Syracuse University College of Law 
 
Dee Pridgen 
Carl M. Williams Professor of Law and Social Responsibility, University of Wyoming College of Law 
 
David Reiss 
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School 
 
Florence Roisman 
William F. Harvey Professor of Law and Chancellor's Professor, Indiana University Robert H. 
McKinney School of Law 
 
Lisa Servon 
Professor and Chair, Department of City and Regional Planning, University of Pennsylvania 
 
Marcella Silverman 
Clinical Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law 
 
Neil Sobol 
Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law 
 
Jeff Sovern 
Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law 
 
Gregory Squires 
Professor of Sociology and Public Policy & Public Administration, George Washington University 
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Debra Stark 
Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School 
 
Mark Totten 
Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law 
 
William Vukowich 
Professor of Law, Georgetown 
 
Amy Widman 
Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law 
 
Lauren Willis 
Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles 
 
Arthur Wilmarth 
Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School 
 
Eric Wright 
Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law 
 
 
I.  THE CONSUMER BUREAU NEEDS A STRONG AND INDEPENDENT ENFORCEMENT 
PROGRAM TO PREVENT THE PROFOUND HARM UNLAWFUL FINANCIAL PRACTICES 
IMPOSE ON AMERICAN CONSUMERS 
 
A. Unlawful Consumer Financial Services are Dangerous and Can Harm the Public 
 
An enduring lesson of the financial crisis that caused the Great Recession is the simple 
recognition that consumer finance can be dangerous. While estimates vary, approximately 9.3 
million American families lost their homes to foreclosure or short sales following the crisis.2  In the 
aftermath of the financial collapse, nearly $11 trillion in household wealth vanished.3  About eight 
million American jobs disappeared.4 The seasonally adjusted mean duration of unemployment nearly 
                                                     
2 See Jonathan Horn, Foreclosed?  Maybe You Can Buy Again, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (June 5, 2015, 9:41 AM), 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/jun/05/foreclosure-shortsale-boomerang-buyers-real-
estate/; Laura Kusisto, Many Who Lost Homes to Foreclosure in Last Decade Won’t Return—NAR, WALL STREET J. 
(Apr. 20, 2015, 12:50 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/many-who-lost-homes-to-foreclosure-in-last-
decade-wont-return-nar-1429548640; see also Annamaria Andriotis et al., After Foreclosures, Home Buyers Are 
Back, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 8, 2015, 8:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/after-foreclosures-home-
buyers-are-back-1428538655 (providing alternative estimates); Tara Siegel Bernard, Years After the Market 
Collapse, Sidelined Borrowers Return, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/your-
money/a-second-try-at-home-buying-after-the-market-collapse.html (same). 
3 U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xv (2011). 
4 Chris Isidore, 7.9 Million Jobs Lost—Many Forever, CNN MONEY (July 2, 2010, 11:46 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/02/news/economy/jobs_gone_forever/. 
Comments of Financial Regulation and Consumer Protection Scholars on Docket No. CFPB-2018-0003 Page 5 of 14 
doubled the peak duration in prior modern economic downturns.5 The combination of these larger 
macroeconomic trends and failed financial products exacerbated social problems and harmed 
millions of people. In the wake of the foreclosure crisis, the number of homeless families nationwide 
increased by 4% from 2008 to 2009.6  Neighborhoods stricken by foreclosures faced significant 
increases in crime.7  We have long known that families facing financial uncertainty and stress tend to 
have higher incidence of intra-family violence. This proved to be the case during the foreclosure 
crisis when sociologists found a significant increase (sixfold by one measure) in the likelihood that 
children would fall victim to physical abuse.8 And, the foreclosure crisis preceded a 35% increase in 
the number of households facing food insecurity.9 
 
Consumer financial services can also be dangerous on a more personal level. Epidemiologist and 
public health scholars have found that the stress, forgone medical care, and even despair associated 
with financial distress are unhealthy.10 For example, scientific studies have demonstrated an 
association between home mortgage foreclosure and significant increases in illness, including heart 
attacks, strokes, respiratory failure, gastrointestinal hemorrhage, and kidney failure.11 More recently, 
epidemiologists from the University of Washington found that use of fringe loan products, such as 
                                                     
5 Henry S. Farber, Job Loss in the Great Recession and Its Aftermath:  U.S. Evidence from the Displaced Workers Survey 
3–4 (Nat’1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21216, 2015), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21216 (“A related concern is the unprecedentedly long average duration of 
unemployment spells. . . .  The mean unemployment rate reached about 20 weeks in the three earlier 
recessions . . . but rose to 37 weeks in the Great Recession.”). 
6 M. William Sermons & Peter Witte, State of Homelessness in America, NAT’L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS & 
HOMELESSNESS RESEARCH INST. 1 (Jan. 2011), http://www.endhomelessness.org/page/-
/files/The_State_of_Homelessness_in_America_2011.pdf. 
7 Lin Cui & Randall Walsh, Foreclosure, Vacancy and Crime, 87 J. URB. ECON. 72, 80 (2015); Ryan M. Goodstein 
& Yan Y. Lee, Do Foreclosures Increase Crime? 3 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2010-05, 
2010). 
8 Jeanne Brooks-Gunn et al., The Great Recession and the Risk for Child Maltreatment, 37 CHILD ABUSE & 
NEGLECT 721, 725 (2013). 
9 Patricia M. Anderson et al., Food Insecurity and the Great Recession:  The Role of Unemployment 
Duration, Credit and Housing Markets 1 (June 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Texas A&M 
University); see also Deborah A. Frank et al., Heat or Eat:  The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program and 
Nutritional and Health Risks Among Children Less than 3 Years of Age, 118 PEDIATRICS e1293 (2006) (evaluating 
the “association between a family's participation or nonparticipation in the Low Income Home Energy 
Assistance Program and the anthropometric status and health of their young children”); T. Jelleyman & N. 
Spencer, Residential Mobility in Childhood and Health Outcomes:  A Systematic Review, 62 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 
COMMUNITY HEALTH 584 (2008) (describing the harmful effects of residential mobility on pediatric health); 
Margot B. Kushel et al., Housing Instability and Food Insecurity as Barriers to Health Care Among Low-Income 
Americans, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 71 (2006) (showing the harmful effects of food insecurity on health). 
10 E. Thomas Garman et al., Financial Stress Among American Workers: Final Report: 30 Million Workers in 
America—One in Four—Are Seriously Financially Distressed and Dissatisfied Causing Negative Impacts on 
Individuals, Families, and Employers 17 (2005), 
http://www.personalfinancefoundation.org/features/feature3full.pdf. 
11 Ana V. Diez Roux, Editorial, The Foreclosure Crisis and Cardiovascular Disease, 129 CIRCULATION 2248, 2248–
49 (2014). See also Mariana Arcaya et al., Effects of Proximate Foreclosed Properties on Individuals’ Systolic Blood Pressure 
in Massachusetts, 1987 to 2008, 129 CIRCULATION 2262, 2266 (2014) (“The presence of real estate—owned 
foreclosed properties near participants’ homes predicted higher measured systolic blood pressure in a large 
cohort.”). 
Comments of Financial Regulation and Consumer Protection Scholars on Docket No. CFPB-2018-0003 Page 6 of 14 
payday loans, “was associated with 38 percent higher prevalence of poor or fair health.”12 Tragically, 
studies suggest that the foreclosure crisis was partially responsible for a 13% increase in the national 
suicide rate through between 2005 and 2010.13 
 
The economic, social, and personal risks to the public from financial services related problems 
are not merely historical. Recent Federal Reserve data show deeply troubling trends in the student 
loan market. The student loan delinquency rate has been climbing since the Great Recession and 
now exceeds 10%.14 This figure understates the potential problem from what the Minneapolis 
Federal Reserve Bank called “a rising mountain of student debt” because a substantial portion of 
outstanding student loans are not in the repayment stage while borrowers are still in school or 
deferment.15 These delinquency rates are particularly puzzling given that federal student loan 
borrowers should be able to avail themselves of income-based repayment programs. America risks 
its future by leaving millions of young people to start their adult lives deeply mired in delinquent 
debts that are not normally dischargeable in bankruptcy. Transcending partisan politics, Republican 
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell recently shared our concerns stating: “You do stand to see 
longer-term negative effects on people who can’t pay off their student loans . . . . It hurts their credit 
rating, it impacts the entire half of their economic life.” 16  
 
B. America Needs a Strong and Independent Civil Law Enforcement Program 
Providing Oversight in the Consumer Financial Services Market. 
 
We recognize that current consumer finance trends as well as the consequences of the Great 
Recession are complicated. But as scholars of consumer financial services and related fields, we 
believe that enforcement of laws protecting consumers from illegal consumer financial services 
practices is critically important in tempering the potentially harmful effects of consume finance run 
amok. Americans need an effective and efficient consumer financial services law enforcement 
agency to stop those practices that Congress has prohibited under federal law. Of course, there are 
many honorable and well-meaning individuals and businesses that are providing beneficial consumer 
financial services to the public. And, we recognize that effective law enforcement is not sufficient by 
itself to address every consumer finance policy problem. Nevertheless, the consumer finance policy 
agenda created by Congress cannot succeed if the legal levers of that policy remain unenforced or 
are subject to manipulation by those who might to frustrate Congressional intent. From our 
perspective as scholars, we believe that America has an ongoing need for creative, efficient, and 
aggressive consumer financial law enforcement. 
                                                     
12 Jerzy Eisenberg-Guyot, et al., From Payday Loans to Pawnshops: Fringe Banking, the Unbanked, and Health, 37 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 429, 429 (2018). 
13 Jason N. Houle & Michael T. Light, The Home Foreclosure Crisis and Rising Suicide Rates, 2005 to 2010, 104 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 1073, 1073 (2014). 
14 See Ashwini Sankar, A rising mountain of student debt: Blame (maybe) tuition hikes, the Great Recession and lower college 
completion rates, FEDGAZETTE (April 4, 2018) https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/fedgazette/a-
rising-mountain-of-student-debt. 
15 Id. 
16 Jeff Cox, Student Debt Could Hold Back Economic Growth, Should be Discharged in Bankruptcy, Fed Chief Says,  
CNBC, March 1, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/01/student-loan-problems-could-hold-back-
economic-growth-fed-chief-says.html. 
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Free-market competition does not work well when businesses can use deceptive or misleading 
practices to compete. Markets work best when each business or individual makes informed, self-
interested decisions that collectively allocate scare resources in the most efficient distribution we can 
reasonably expect. Adam Smith famously described the phenomenon of self-interested individual 
decisions creating collective welfare as “an invisible hand” guiding policy to an optimal outcome.17 
We normally expect that each individual decision maker within a market economy will rationally 
compare the cost of any financial service with its next-best alternative. Our hope is that when 
individuals select products or services with the lowest opportunity cost, inefficient products and 
services are disciplined out of the marketplace. However, if one supplier can misrepresent the costs 
or benefits of its products without consequence, then consumers cannot engage in the rational 
comparison of alternatives that drives the market to efficient outcomes. When negative 
consequences for deception are muted, some businesses will rationally choose to innovate through 
developing newer, more difficult to detect strategies for misleading customers.18 When consumers 
cannot distinguish between misleading and accurate offers, the businesses that compete by truthfully 
offering the best product or service are left at a competitive disadvantage. And, if consumers 
themselves recognize that they cannot identify value, they may rationally satisfice to the first sub-
optimal option to avoid the wasted transaction costs of comparing alternatives. Markets need a 
watchdog that raises the cost of deceit beyond its marginal expected utility.19 
 
C. The Consumer Bureau Has a Strong Track Record of Deterring Deceptive 
Consumer Financial Practices—But, this Successful Program Now Appears to Be in 
Jeopardy 
 
Early on the Consumer Bureau established an admirable track record of productively enforcing 
our nation’s consumer financial services laws—especially with respect to deceptive or misleading 
practices. The Bureau has focused on cases where businesses engaged in deceptive or misleading 
practices more than any other type of case. As illustrated in Table 1, through the end of 2015 nearly 
60 percent of the Bureau’s cases included a count for engaging in an illegal deceptive act or practice. 
Moreover, these cases were not small matters. Cases that included a deception claim produced 
almost 10.5 billion dollars in consumer relief in the form of refunds or forgiven debts. This figure 
amounted to 93 percent of the total consumer relief awarded by the Bureau during this time period. 
These figures far outpaced the number of cases and amount of relief produced in matters alleging 
violations of enumerated statutes, such as the Truth in Lending Act or the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act. The upshot is that the Bureau appears to have kept sight of the legal theory around which a 
                                                     
17 Adam Smith, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 225-26 
(Richard F. Teichgraeber, III, ed., Random House, 1985). 
18 Paul Heidhues, Botond Köszegi, & Takeshi Murooka, Exploitative Innovation, 8 AM. ECON. J.: 
MICROECONOMICS 1, 3 (2016) (setting out an economic model that explains, “why firms in many financial 
industries have been willing to make contract innovations with deceptive features that others could easily 
copy, and raise the general concern that resources are directed disproportionately toward these kinds of 
innovations.”). 
19 Paul Heidhues, Botond Köszegi, & Takeshi Murooka, Inferior Products and Profitable Deception, 84 REV. OF 
ECON. STUDIES 323, 339-341 (2017) (providing an economic model of suboptimal deceptive equilibrium in 
credit card and mortgage markets). 
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national consensus presumably exists. Surely all Americans can agree that deceptive or misleading 
consumer financial services are illegal and should be the subject of legitimate civil law enforcement. 
 
Table 1. CFPB Enforcement of Selected Consumer Financial Laws, 2012-2015. 
Law 
Cases 
enforcing Cases against Consumer relief 
a CMPsa 
n % banks nonbanks $ x 1000 % $ x 1000 % 
Truth in Lending Act 18 14.8 4 14 306,901.2 2.7 22,616.0 5.8 
Fair Credit Reporting Act 14 11.5 4 10 375,130.2 3.3 65,835.0 17.0 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act 8 6.6 6 2 493,250.0 4.4 30,900.0 8.0 
Fair Debt Col. Practices Act 11 9.0 1 10 782,699.7 7.0 42,150.0 10.9 
Electronic Funds Transfer Act 6 4.9 1 5 64,229.1 0.6 10,600.0 2.7 
Real Estate Settlement Pro’s Act 21 17.2 4 17 101,764.5 0.9 70,467.0 18.2 
Deceptive Acts or Practices 73 59.8 19 54 10,467,098.1 93.2 253,836.0 65.5 
a Consumer relief and civil money penalty figures reflect total awards generated in cases that included each type of 
statutory claim. These total awards may be attributable in part to other claims asserted in each case. 
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015 in Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TULANE L. REV. 1057, 1094 (2016). 
 
Nevertheless, in the past six months, the Bureau’s long-standing track record of bringing 
common-sense enforcement actions against businesses engaged in deceptive practices appears to be 
in jeopardy. From the Bureau’s inception through November of 2017 the Bureau announced 200 
public enforcement actions. Beginning in July of 2012, the Consumer Bureau announced 
approximately 3.2 enforcement cases per month—almost one case per week. However, as illustrated 
in Figure 1, since the transition in leadership in November of 2017, the number of public law 
enforcement cases announced by the Bureau has plummeted to only one case in the past half-year. 
By any customary metric for law enforcement productivity this decline in publicly announced 
cases would be a distressing sign. For example, “[p]olice department performance is typically 
measured through ‘clearance rates’ for criminal offenses, which usually require that at least one 
individual is arrested for the offense, charged, and turned over to the court for prosecution.”20 In 
recent months, the Bureau’s clearance rate has crashed through the precinct floor—even though the 
number of employees available for law enforcement has held nearly steady. In our view, this raises 
fundamental questions about whether the Bureau’s leadership remains committed to deterring 
deception and other illegal activity in the financial services industry. Given this distressing trend, we 
encourage the Bureau to undertake immediate action to refocus and reinvigorate its law enforcement 
program.  
                                                     
20 Anthony A. Braga and Desiree Dusseault, Can Police Improve Homicide Clearance Rates? HARVARD KENNEDY 
SCHOOL RAPPAPORT INSTITUTE FOR GREATER BOSTON POLICY BRIEFS 1 (November 2017), 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/rappaport/files/braga_homicideclearance%20v7.p
df. 
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II. SPECIFIC STEPS IN FACILITATING AND EFFECTIVE BUREAU LAW ENFORCEMENT 
PROCESSES 
 
A. Overview 
 
In this section we respond to specific topics raised by the Bureau’s RFI on Enforcement Processes. 
By way of overview, our responses draw on the four themes. To be effective the Consumer Bureau’s 
enforcement processes should: 
 
• Support career enforcement staff with the resources, flexibility, and decision-making 
authority they need to efficiently investigate, litigate, and settle cases; 
• Minimize unnecessary meetings, communication, unproductive internal reports or 
memoranda, and other distractions that may be causing Bureau’s recent decline in 
enforcement productivity; 
• Promote remedial policies that both fully compensate consumers for all harm caused by 
illegal financial services practices and deter future illegal conduct with stiff civil money 
penalties; and, 
• Shelter the Bureau’s law enforcement fact-finding and decision-making from political 
pressure and corporate meddling. 
 
B. Topics Raised by the Bureau’s RFI on Enforcement Processes. 
 
• Bureau Career Professional Staff Should Retain Substantial Flexibility and Discretion 
in their Communications with Investigation Subjects. Consumer financial services 
investigations, litigation, settlement negotiations, and consent order monitoring all require 
8
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highly context dependent communication. For example, the appropriate frequency and 
timing of communication with an investigation subject may depend on the size and 
resources of the subject, the risk of revealing confidential investigatory information, and the 
nature of the investigation itself. A money-center bank under investigation in a matter 
involving hundreds of millions of dollars may require more detailed and frequent 
communication than a modest case with relatively simple enumerated statutory violations. 
The Bureau may need a different communication approach when investigating reputable 
companies that are cooperating with the investigation than when investigating fraudulent 
actors who are obstructing the investigation in bad faith. Moreover, some investigation 
subjects may seek to take advantage of communication with staff to waste time or lobby for 
special treatment and favors. It is imperative that the Bureau’s law enforcement processes 
remain independent from influence campaigns by special interests. Of course, all 
investigation subjects should be entitled to professional and courteous treatment. But, not 
every investigation subject should be entitled to detailed information on the unfolding nature 
of a complex investigation at a time and manner of their choosing. Our review of the 
Bureau’s Policies and Procedures leaves us confident that the Bureau is currently well 
positioned to communicate effectively with investigation subjects.21 We do not recommend 
changes to existing policies. 
 
• The Bureau Should Maintain Flexibility in the Overall Length of Investigations, but 
Should Not Tolerate Delay or Obstruction by Investigation Subjects. On the one hand 
we believe that prompt investigations are desirable both for investigation subjects and 
victims of unlawful consumer financial practices. Defendants should not be allowed to 
engage in dilatory practices in responding to civil investigative demands, scheduling hearings 
in aid of investigation, or producing documents. On the other hand, the impulse to 
investigate quickly should not justify closing yet-to-be completed investigations that are 
necessary to address illegal activity. A one-size-fits-all approach to the length of Bureau 
enforcement investigations would not reflect the complex reality of gathering facts needed to 
effectively respond to consumer harm. The same timing considerations don't necessarily 
apply to different actors and different types of illegal behavior. Moreover, imposing an 
artificial deadline or timeframe on investigations could create a perverse incentive for 
investigation subjects to engaging in stonewalling. If investigations are time-limited in some 
way, then subjects will be tempted to slow-walk fact-finding in order to extend the 
investigation beyond the relevant timeframe. Within our view, the Bureau’s investigations 
have generally proceeded at a reasonable pace and been reasonable in overall length. 
However, we are concerned that in the past six months the Bureau’s failure to announce a 
reasonable number of law enforcement actions suggests that investigations may be breaking 
down under new leadership. Bureau managers should speed investigations by backing up 
career professional staff in settlement negotiations, encouraging staff to proceed 
                                                     
21 CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, OFF. OF ENFORCEMENT, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 
VERSION 3.0 37 (2017), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201710_cfpb_enforcement-policies-
and-procedures-memo_version-3.0.pdf [hereinafter “POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL VERSION 3.0”]. 
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expeditiously, and setting firm expectations with investigation subjects hoping for special 
treatment; but, not by closing matters where there is credible evidence of illegal activity. 
 
• The Bureau Should Not Revise its Notice and Opportunity to Respond and Advise 
(NORA) Procedures. Largely based on the process followed by the SEC, the Bureau’s 
optional NORA process is appropriate to the Bureau’s mission and is not in need of 
revisions. Under the current Bureau Policies and Procedures enforcement staff are expected 
to use the NORA process in most cases but have discretion to forego the process with 
approval from management when there is a valid reason to do so.22 The NORA process 
should not be mandatory and the timeframe for NORA responses should not be extended in 
a way that will slow down enforcement cases. The Bureau should not hinder career 
enforcement staff by creating additional procedural or drafting hurdles in order to complete 
the NORA process. And, Bureau staff should retain considerable discretion in determining 
what details are provided in a NORA call. The Bureau’s existing ten-point check list on 
NORA disclosures already provides sufficient guidance to enforcement staff on how to 
handle this optional process.23 We believe that current NORA procedures strike a reasonable 
balance between subjects’ pre-suit interest in case-related information and the Bureau’s 
interest in promoting prompt law enforcement and efficient use of resources.  
 
• The Bureau Should Not Establish a Right for Financial Services Companies to Make 
an In-Person Presentation to Bureau Personnel Prior to the Bureau Determining 
Whether it Should Initiate Legal Proceedings. A meeting of this type is unnecessary 
because investigation subjects already have ample opportunity to engage in settlement 
negotiations. Moreover, this meeting would be a costly duplication of the forty-page NORA 
response memos that the vast majority of investigation subjects already file with the Bureau 
staff. Similar law enforcement offices at the state and federal level do not provide 
investigation subjects with the right to make an in-person presentation. Moreover, if the 
Bureau were to create such a right, it is critical that the Bureau not allow this presentation 
right to create scheduling bottlenecks or undermine the negotiating position of line staff by 
requiring the presence of the Bureau’s senior enforcement leadership. Also, if investigation 
subjects get a right to present, so too should consumers that were harmed by the subjects 
acts or practices in question. Overall, we believe a required meeting of this type would serve 
primarily to create delays, establish a perception of unfairness, undermine settlement 
negotiations, and duplicate the litigation process in federal court or administrative 
proceedings.  
 
• The Bureau Should Not Revise its Civil Money Penalty (CMP) Procedures to Create 
a Quasi-Mathematical CMP “Matrix.” Adopting a CMP matrix similar to the matrix in 
use by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) is likely to undermine the 
bargaining position of Bureau enforcement staff. A matrix will extend and complicate 
settlement negotiations by emboldening defense counsel to debate scoring within the various 
                                                     
22 POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL VERSION 3.0 at 94. 
23 Id. at 96. 
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component inputs of the matrix. On balance, a penalty matrix will also tend to act as an 
anchor inhibiting the Bureau’s deterrence of the most serious violations of the law. In 
business planning, some companies will project a worst-case scenario for CMP liability based 
on estimates drawn from the matrix and rationally engage in illegal activity when their 
expected profits exceed their liability estimates. The current statutory factors adopted by 
Congress enhance deterrence by leaving the predatory strategist second-guessing whether 
Bureau staff (subject to judicial oversight) will successfully identify the point at which 
breaking the law is no longer profitable. Creating and implementing the matrix will also 
divert Bureau staff away from actually bringing enforcement cases. Moreover, to the extent 
that a matrix is helpful, existing policies and procedures already allow Bureau staff to take 
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council matrices under advisement in 
settlement negotiations.24 Finally, Congress could have chosen to follow the approach taken 
by the OCC but decided not to. We believe the Bureau should not weaken its law 
enforcement bargaining position sua sponte. 
 
• The Bureau Should Use the Standard Consent Order Terms and Conditions in Use 
Prior to 2018.  In our experience, the provisions included in Bureau consent orders prior to 
2018 were substantially similar to provisions typically found in orders of other regulators, 
including the OCC and the FTC. Much of the Bureau’s standard orders appears to be 
derived from FTC consent orders. These provisions are time-tested and relatively 
uncontroversial. We do not believe it is advisable to modify them at this time. However, the 
Bureau’s one public enforcement action announced in the past six months, against Wells 
Fargo, appears to depart from past practices in at least one important way. This order 
provides that the bank is to develop its own restitution plan subject to non-objection by the 
Bureau; but, it sets no minimum amounts and allows Wells to identify who is eligible and the 
amount of payment based on its determination of consumer “economic or other cognizable 
harm.”25 We are concerned that the use of this phrase along with the failure to fully resolve 
the details of the restitution program and the discretion given to the bank to make initial 
determinations about the dollar amount of restitution could be used to limit the recovery 
harmed consumers are likely to receive. In litigation with state attorneys general and private 
plaintiffs, banks and other financial services companies often take the position that 
consumers cannot demonstrate they were individually harmed in resisting payment to 
consumers affected by violations. In the future, we encourage the Bureau to negotiate a 
minimum floor for consumer relief prior to announcing settlement agreements and exclude 
                                                     
24 Id. at 130. 
25 Compare In re Wells Fargo Bank, NA, File No. 2018-BCFP-0001, at ¶ 51 (April 20, 2018), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_wells-fargo-bank-na_consent-
order_2018-04.pdf (failing to specify a minimum redress dollar amount and authorizing the bank to limit its 
own remediation plan to those customers it determines to have “an economic or other cognizable harm”) with 
In re Wells Fargo Bank, NA, File No. 2016-CFPB-0013, at ¶ 73 (August 22, 2016), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/2016-CFPB-
0013Wells_Fargo_Bank_N.A.--_Consent_Order.pdf (providing a minimum amount of redress to affected 
consumers of “no less than $410,000” and nowhere authorizing the bank to limit relief based on “economic 
and cognizable harm”). 
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the controversial concept of “economic or other cognizable” harm from its template 
agreement.  
 
• The Bureau Should Actively Coordinate with Enforcement Partners in Order to 
Maximize Consumer Relief and Deter Illegal Activity. In general, the Bureau has 
actively and successfully collaborated with other federal and state law enforcement partners. 
Prior to 2016 the Bureau cited some form of collaborative enforcement in 33.6 percent of its 
publicly announced enforcement actions.26 These cases produced about $10.6 billion in 
consumer redress—which constituted about 95 percent of all redress awarded by the Bureau 
at that time.27 The Bureau’s law enforcement partners have included United States 
Department of Education, the Department of Justice, the Federal Communications 
Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, the OCC, HUD, the FTC, 49 state governments, the District of 
Columbia, and the Navajo Nation Department of Justice. In many of the largest, national 
cases, Bureau leadership should continue to anticipate that coordination with other law 
enforcement partners will likely be necessary. On the other hand, sometimes partnership 
enforcement actions can require additional time and resources with a relatively modest 
marginal increase in restitution and fines. In certain contexts, the CFPB has unique legal 
tools compared to state partners with respect to penalties, nationwide jurisdiction, and 
investigative authorities. Coordination is important, but the solution is not to simply say that 
if the states are bringing enforcement cases against a defendant (or a type of defendant), then 
the CFPB can abdicate its law enforcement responsibilities. We believe that the Bureau 
should take a flexible approach to inter-agency coordination that balances the benefits and 
drawbacks of collaboration with an eye toward deploying the most cost-effective deterrent 
of illegal activity possible.  
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
In response to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, the United States Congress 
established the Consumer Bureau and charged it with primary law enforcement responsibility for 
our nation’s consumer financial services laws. By law, Congress gave the Bureau the fiscal resources 
necessary to create and deploy a formidable law enforcement team. We believe the Bureau has 
succeeded in creating a strong and effective Enforcement Office with sound policies and 
procedures. For several years the Bureau has used these resources, staff, and processes to 
successfully enforce the law. We recognize that financial institutions, their trade associations, and 
lawyers are likely to lobby for additional procedural hoops and barriers to law enforcement. In our 
view these comments should be taken with a healthy dose of skepticism. In 201 enforcement 
actions, the Consumer Bureau has amassed an overwhelmingly successful track record while its 
litigation setbacks can be counted on one hand. In every single Bureau enforcement action, the 
defendants had the right to make their case before a United States District Court Judge or federal 
administrative law judge—something millions of consumers are not entitled to because of binding 
                                                     
26 Peterson, supra note X, at 1083. 
27 Id. 
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arbitration clauses and class action waivers included within their boilerplate financial services 
contracts.  
Despite this critical role for public law enforcement, in the past six months, Bureau leadership 
has frozen hiring of law enforcement staff (even when needed to replace departures or retirements), 
requested $0 additional funds transfers from the Federal Reserve to fund the Bureau, attempted to 
eliminate the Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity, and announced only one public 
enforcement case with no specified minimum amount of consumer restitution. We believe and agree 
that elections have consequences. However, the public expects, the laws of the United States 
demand, and the constitutional oaths of Bureau’s staff require the Bureau to continue vigorously 
enforcing consumer protection law.  
